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however, our slate is not blank. In light of Reed’s decision upholding
trial de novo provisions in uninsured-motorist policies against a public
policy challenge, any subsequent analysis of the provisions in
underinsured-motorist policies must, in our view, consider the
relationship between uninsured-motorist coverage and underinsured-motorist
coverage. As we recognized in Reed itself, however, this
relationship was not implicated in Bugailiskis. Reed, 188 Ill. 2d at
174.
Finally, Rosen argues that the legislature’s decision not to make
any reference to trial de novo provisions in the underinsured-motorist
statute indicates an intent “not to link” the underinsured-motorist and
uninsured-motorist statutes in this regard. She argues that where the
uninsured-motorist statute endorses the trial de novo provisions
explicitly, we should not read mere silence as also an endorsement of
the provisions. We agree. However, we will similarly not read mere
silence as a prohibition of the provisions. To do so would be to
require the legislature to enumerate in every statute all actions private
parties may take that would not violate public policy. Here, the
legislature has done more than simply allow the trial de novo
provisions in a highly related statute. The provisions must appear in
uninsured-motorist policies; if an insurance policy does not contain a
trial de novo provision in its uninsured-motorist coverage, it is
contrary to the statute and unenforceable as against public policy.
Schultz, 237 Ill. 2d at 400 (“[t]erms of an insurance policy that
conflict with a statute are void and unenforceable”). To hold, as
Rosen urges, that the same insurance policy also violates public policy
if it does include the provision in its underinsured-motorist coverage
would be anomalous, and Rosen has not provided any difference
between the two statutes that would lead us to such a result.
We note also that no other state has adopted such a difference.
Courts in several states have invalidated trial de novo provisions on
public policy grounds. See, e.g., Mendes v. Automobile Insurance Co.
of Hartford, 563 A.2d 695 (Conn. 1989); Worldwide Insurance
Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992); Schmidt v. Midwest
Family Mutual Insurance Co., 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1988);
Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992);
Pepin v. American Universal Insurance Co., 540 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1988).
However, as Phoenix urges and Rosen concedes, no state has
