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              regard to multiple acts, where one of the offenses is a lesser included offense of
the other. However, King does not prohibit multiple convictions for the
simultaneous possession of multiple firearms without an FOID card. Although the
“singular act of failing to possess a FOID card could not sustain multiple
convictions of an offense comprised solely of that act, failing to possess a FOID
card may serve as a common element of multiple offenses that include additional
physical acts - possession of different firearms, or of firearm ammunition.”
2. However, the court concluded that the General Assembly did not intend
to authorize multiple convictions for the simultaneous possession of multiple
weapons without an FOID card. In determining whether the legislature intended
to permit multiple convictions, the court is required to determine the “allowable
unit of prosecution” for §65/2(a). Where a statute is ambiguous as to the allowable
unit of prosecution, the court “must adopt a construction which favors the
defendant.”
In People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295, 821 N.E.2d 233 (2004), the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that a statute which prohibited the possession of “any
firearm or any firearm ammunition” was ambiguous because it could be read as
providing either that the possession of each firearm constituted a separate offense,
or as providing that the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms and
ammunition constitute only a single offense. Because the statute was ambiguous,
the Carter court adopted an interpretation that favored the defendant and held
that the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms and ammunition
constituted only a single offense.
The court reached the same conclusion concerning §65/2(a)(1), which uses
similar language to the statute in Carter. Thus, because the legislature did not
intend that the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms constitutes multiple
violations of §65/2(a)(1), two of three of defendant’s convictions under (a)(1) must
be vacated.
The court reached the opposite conclusion concerning the possession of
ammunition, however. The court concluded that had the General Assembly
intended the simultaneous possession of firearms and ammunition to constitute
a single unit of prosecution, it would have placed the firearms and ammunition
provisions in a single statute rather than in two separate subsections. The court
concluded that the structure of §65(a) showed that the General Assembly intended
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