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Foley court concluded the specific venue statute of the Uniform
Arbitration Act was the applicable venue provision. Foley, 333
Ill. App. 3d at 503, 775 N.E.2d at 668. The Mazur court, which
also addressed the Uniform Arbitration Act's venue provision,
based its holding on the statutory-construction rule that, where
two statutes relate to the same subject, the particular statute
prevails over the general one. Mazur, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 875,
619 N.E.2d at 764, citing People ex rel. Myers v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 19 Ill. 2d 122, 129, 166 N.E.2d 86, 90 (1960).
Defendant contends Foley is distinguishable because the
Uniform Arbitration Act provides for only one county to be a
proper venue and thus is a local action. On the other hand, the
"final administrative order" language provides for a transitory
action. We disagree with defendant's distinction. It is still a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that, when a general
statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in
the same or in another act, relate to the same subject and are in
conflict, "'the specific provision controls and should be ap-plied.'"
Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System, 212
Ill. 2d 58, 77, 816 N.E.2d 303, 313 (2004), quoting Knolls
Condominium Ass'n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459, 781 N.E.2d 261,
267 (2002). The distinction alleged by defendant has no effect
on the aforementioned rule. Moreover, if an arbitration hearing
has not been held, the Uniform Arbitration Act's venue provision