No. 2--08--0061
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being used as a residence. Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of the Disclosure Act, it was
applicable to the transaction.
The defendants argue that, because the plaintiff's intent when it purchased the property was
to tear down the existing house, the Disclosure Act did not apply to the transaction. The Disclosure
Act, however, specifically lists nine exceptions to its applicability. See 765 ILCS 77/15 (West
2006). A buyer's intent to tear down a residential structure and rebuild on the property is not listed
as an exception. We must not depart from a statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions,
limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. O'Keefe, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 828.
Thus, in this case, the plaintiff's original intent to tear down the existing house did not render the
Disclosure Act inapplicable. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the defendants' section
2--619 motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of the Disclosure Act and breach of
contract.
In so ruling, we note that the trial court relied on Grady in finding that the plaintiff's intent
to raze the home on the property removed the transaction from the realm of the Disclosure Act. In
Grady, the parties entered into a contract for the sale of real property. Grady, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 775.
The property included a two-story building that Grady intended to demolish in order to construct a
multi-unit condominium building. Grady, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 775. The building had been stripped
of its fixtures and, thus, lacked cabinets, toilets, appliances, lighting, a furnace, a water heater, and
other amenities. Grady, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 775. The sale was treated as one for vacant property.
Grady, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 776.
After purchasing the property, Grady discovered a soil condition that resulted in additional
costs in constructing the condominium building. Grady, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 776. When Sikorski had
